Abstract
Introduction
The increasing dependency of core business processes and activities on information technology has transformed IT security management to a boardroom issue. Due to the different focus on security taken by business managers vs. more technically oriented security professionals we consider it important to employ methods and models that bridge those differing views. With this problem in mind an approach that models business and technical oriented concepts of an enterprise system was developed [5] . The approach is based on the ideas of enterprise modeling and enterprise architectures [3] .
The approach that far consisted of metamodels that define the concepts and interrelations to specify an enterprise model and to depict security related concepts and information. In addition a guided process that attributes responsibilities to various roles and their collaboration has been defined [11] . However until now, the approach was solely qualitative in nature and a quantitative analysis of the models was not yet available. In this paper we present the extended approach introducing concepts and methods that support a quantitative assessment of security.
For this purpose we introduce a quantitative assessment that is based on the following measures. First of all, we introduce a measure that quantifies the ratio of attacks that results in successful breaches of security requirements. For this purpose we count the number of attacks for a specific period of time. Second, we quantify the propagation effect of successful attacks. Finally, when the numbers of violations of security requirements directly derived from a business security objective are found we compute the losses for the enterprise caused by failing to fulfil the objective.
The article is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the Enterprise Model that is the basis of our approach. In section 3 we describe the Security Model that contains the security relevant information. In section 4 we describe our approach of quantitative assessment of security. In section 5 we give an overview of our ideas how to use the quantitative measures to guide security investment decisions. In the last sections we discuss strenghts and weaknesses of our appoach, give an overview of related and future work.
Enterprise Model
The proposed assessment method is based on the modelling of enterprise IT architecture which has been presented in [5, 11] . In this paper we just outline the main concepts of the approach which are relevant for the current paper. Those who are interested in a more detailed discussion about the modelling are referred to [5, 11] . The enterprise meta-model contains three layers ( Figure 1 ):
Business Layer. The Business layer contains business oriented artifacts. First of all it contains Organizational Unit which can be the enterprise as a whole, business units or departments. Roles are collective sets of responsibilities and obligations imposed on an employee which plays this role in the enterprise. Role, which is a part of an Organizational Unit, is involved in one or several business processes Figure 1 . Enterprise meta-model of the enterprise. Business process is a predefined sequence of activities leading to accomplishing of a goal. Business process may be seen as a hierarchy of sub-processes or atomic activities. Information Objects depict the information which is used by business processes.
In this paper we do not deal with Organizational Units and Roles assuming that these artifacts cannot be impacted by security breaches.
Application Layer. On the application layer we only have Components. Components are the applications used by some business process (by one of its activities).
Technical Layer. Technical layer contains nodes. Node is a software and hardware set which provide all required services for Components to operate or Information Objects to be stored. For example, node can be a server with Windows Server 2003 installed and running an Oracle database. Nodes can be hierarchically modelled.
In general an enterprise model may be presented as it is shown in Figure 2 . 
Security model of an enterprise
We need the enterprise model for the identification of interdependencies between model elements. This information is used for the elicitation and specification of security requirements for these elements. The elicitation starts with identification of a business security objective (BSO) (or business security goal). Domain owners ascertain if the BSO is relevant for some of the elements in their domains (typically it is done for business model elements). These model elements are root elements of Dependency Graphs which contain all elements contributing to satisfaction of the business security objective. The business security objective is then specialized for the model elements to specify security requirements [24] . It is advisable to have several requirements if the impact on the organization caused by not fulfilling the requirements varies too much. This facilitates the assessment of the monetary impact on the BSO. Then the security requirements are decomposed further according to the Dependency Graphs to specify the security requirements for dependant model elements. Requirements may be decomposed even on the same level to make the analysis more fine-grained if it is necessary. The received graph is called Security Requirements Graph and shows how security requirements for high level model elements impose requirements for lower elements. Figure 4 At this point one can see that the graph may have circles. On the business level the circle can be formed by "input" and "output" dependencies between processes and Information Objects. The simplest circle means that a business process compromises an Information Object and then uses it and, as a consequence, compromises itself. Although this situation is possible (if one instance of the business process compromises the object in order to violate another instance of the same business process) we consider such a situation as highly improbable. Therefore, we assume that such circles should not be taken into account. In the graph this means that the dependency, which leads from one requirement to another one that in its turn influences the former requirement through some dependency chain, is not included in the Security Requirements Graph.
Example 2 In
On the technical level the circle can be formed by "linkto" bidirectional relations. The simplest example is network connections: a workstation is connected to a server and vice versa. Analysis taking into account such relations can show how a threat (e.g., worm) propagates through technical layer. On the other hand, data for our analysis (Section 4) is more likely to be taken from security logs of the nodes and thus we will already have the total number of attacks for the node. This means that we do not have to consider the dependencies between nodes because the threat propagation is already taken into account by premise data.
Quantitative assessment of the model
The next step in the security analysis process is the identification of potential threats and their risk assessment. For this purpose the Security Meta Model (see Figure 5 ) defines risk as a triple of a model element of the Enterprise Model, a security requirement attached to the element and a threat that targets the specific model element and breaches the related security requirement. We therefore have a specific notion of Risk that is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A Risk is defined as any threat that targets a specific model element and may result in the violation of a security requirement.

Figure 5. Security meta-model
Since the main security goal is to prevent bad events from happening we can reformulate our goal in the negative way [25, 20] : analyze how much the enterprise looses because the BSO fails.
First of all we should find the number of violations of a BSO. For this purpose the requirements should be inverted. The inverted requirements become negative events (threats) which may occur in the system and violate the BSO. We also should invert dependency relations to capture the fact that now low level threats may lead to high level threats (or failure of the higher level requirements). We call this reversed Security Requirements Graph a Threat Graph. Figure 6 . Note that the inversion has been done in such a way as to calculate numbers of threats occurrences, our metric for aggregation. For example, the requirement "prevent 'one-time' fraud" is transformed to the threat "'one-time' fraud". 
Example 3 A Threat Graph for our running example is shown in
Figure 6. Threat Graph with threats and weights
To finalize construction of the Threat Graph concrete threats should be identified.
Definition 3 Concrete threats are context-independent negative events which lead to occurrence of a specific (contextdependent) threat in Threat Graph.
Examples of such concrete threats are: viruses, hacker attacks (exploiting buffer overflow, SQL injection, etc.), theft, power abuse and so forth. Threats can be attached to the requirements at each of three layers. Some threats may occur on the business layer (e.i., procedural), others may target a specific application, the rest affect the business security objective by compromising nodes.
To support the definition and identification of potential threats -apart from the negation of our security objectives and security requirements -we employ standards and catalogues of typical IT security threats [12, 6] . The next step in the preparation of the Threat Graph for the analysis is assigning weights to the edges. A weight attached to an edge denotes the probability for a target threat to occur if a source threat realizes.
This weight may be seen as a multiplication of two components: the attractiveness of a target goal for an attacker and the impact of the source threat to the target threat. In other words, the former component is the probability that the attacker will choose to compromise this target requirement (will realize this target threat). The later component is the probability that the attacker will be able to realize the target threat after achieving some results (source threat) independently from other possible attack paths.
The input values for the model are provided by the respective domain owners who have best knowledge about their domain. They can derive their figures either from historical data collected in an organisation or estimate the respective values using a method of their choice. Formally the graph can be seen as follows:
Definition 4 A Threat Graph T G is a triple T, E, L where T is a set of threats and E is a set of dependency edges. Each dependency edge is an ordered pair t, t from an arbitrary threat t ∈ T (source threat) to a threat t ∈ T (target threat). L is a labelling function which assigns weights to the dependency edges. If we have a domain D then the labelling function is: L : E → D.
Finally, we should assign values to leaf nodes of the Threat Graph. The values show how many successful attacks (realized threats) are expected.
Example 7 In Figure 6 we show the Threat Graph ready for the analysis: with concrete threats, assigned weights and identified expected numbers of attacks in 10 years. We have chosen 10 year period in order not to operate with very small numbers assuming that the bank has a very good protection. Note, that this is done for convenience only and the same analysis can be done for the banking scenario counting risks for 1 year period. We did not draw separate edges from concrete threats to reduce the complexity of the picture. Therefore, the expected numbers of threats are depicted on the right hand of the threats and their contributions to target threats (i.e., weights) are shown on the left. In this example we assume that all inner hierarchical relations have weights equal to 1. See the relations at business layer. This means that once an activity is compromised -the whole business process is compromised. In fact there may be a situation when this assumption does not hold. For example, the contribution will be less than 1 if the failure can be noticed lately while the process is being fulfilled by successful applying the Separation of Duty principle.
Now we can calculate the number of violations for all nodes in the Threat Graph. This can be done by multiplying the values of source threats by corresponding weights. If there are several source requirements contributing to a target threat (several incoming edges) the received numbers are summed up. In other words, for each target threat we apply a weighted function to compute the total expected number of occurrences. This procedure starts from the lowest threats and continues while the numbers of threats are found. HEAP-extract(t'); {randomly} 6: for t , t ∈ Outgoing(t ) do 7: decrement(SOURCE[t]); 8: if SOURCE[t] = 0 then 9:
Example 8 Lets compute the number of misuses of client's software. According to the calculations on the technical
Algorithm 1 Calculation algorithm
for all t i . t i , t ∈ Incoming(t) do 11:
12:
end for 13: HEAP-add(t); 14: end if 15: end for 16 According to the assumptions that the Threat Graph does not contain circles (see the discussion in Section 3) we create the Algorithm 1 for calculation of the number of violations of requirements for root elements.
When the top threats, the ones corresponding to the requirements for root model elements, are reached and numbers (rates) of occurrence (ARO) for them are calculated monetary risk assessment can be conducted. The received numbers are multiplied by the corresponding average single loss expectancy (SLE) and the results are summed up. The final value is the expected loss for the organization caused by failing to fulfil the specific BSO. In other words, we use the formula for classical Risk Assessment calculating Loss Expectancy (ALE) 2 [10] :
We do this multiplication at the end of the aggregation because the monetary impact on business security objective can be determined only when we know the numbers of requirement violations which are directly connected with the objective. Otherwise, we will not be able to separate the impact on various objectives. 
Security Controls
Using the Threat Graph one can also calculate the benefits from implementing countermeasures. Countermeasures in our model may influence the graph in the following two ways: (i) reduce number of concrete threats (ii) decrease the weights of a dependency leading to the threat. In the first case we should reduce the number of occurrences of the concrete threats the countermeasure mitigates. In the second case the countermeasure reduces the probability of a source threat to propagate further successfully.
Example 10
Pre-employment screening strategy (evaluating past behavior, habits, social status of a candidate before the employment) reduces the number of untrustworthy employees in the organization and, therefore, reduces the number of power abuses by 30%. On the other hand, using iTAN 3 instead of TAN reduces the probability to compromise a transaction by attackers who obtained authorization information by phishing by 60%.
According to this change(s) the expected losses should be recalculated. This calculation does not require recomputing the whole Threat Graph but just the part which has been changed. Such analysis can be done for several possible countermeasures. The received reductions can be used for choosing the most appropriate selection.
Countermeasures also have a cost of deployment and maintenance. Therefore, it is advisable to do a cost-benefit analysis [10] to select the best solution. Two points should be taken into account while conducting the cost-benefit analysis using the Threat Graph. By now we considered the impact on one BSO only. On the other hand, the losses could be on lower levels as well. Although a failed authentication procedure costs the enterprise much more than a damaged authentication software (which has to be patched or re-installed) the latter also causes some losses. In order to have the complete picture of losses all these impacts should be summed up. This means that at each reduced threat in the Threat Graph the reductions should be calculated and summed up. Note, that these are losses for a specific threat to a specific model element only. This should facilitate the estimation of the monetary impact. Another point here is that a countermeasure could reduce occurrences of the threats which impact another BSO. To have a complete picture for cost-benefit analysis the Threat Graph constructed for other business security objectives should be evaluated. 
Example 11 A security training program for bank's employees will reduce the number of viruses on client's computers by 40% (less employees will open attachments in untrustworthy mails). These means that
Example 12
Related works
Recently a lot of attention has been devoted to the assessment of security. One of the key problems here is the identification of a suitable indicator. Well-known SSE-CMM [21] uses maturity level (a value from 1 to 5) as an indicator forthe maturity of the security process. Some approaches recommend checking compliance with a security standard (e.g. ISO 17799 [12] ) often using percentage of compliance as a metric for the evaluation [14] .
Taking a more technical view (e.g., vulnerabilities) some authors try to calculate a "mean-time-to-breach" indicator [15, 17] . The most popular approach nowadays is applying risk analysis for security evaluation [7, 22] which is based on economical assessment. In our approach we propose a way to perform the analysis, in a more fine-grained way then classical Risk Assessment allows, which more thoroughly indicates the losses of an enterprise caused by a concrete threat for a specific BSO.
From the discipline of security management a variety of approaches underline the importance of managing information security from a business point of view. Some of these approaches are model-based and/or quantitative and will be related to our work.
An approach that approaches information security from a business perspective is the OCTAVE approach [2] . The difference to our approach is that we employ modelling techniques to visualise the relevant assets and their dependencies using an enterprise model. In the authors opinion the OCTAVE approach is very useful to identify the relevant assets of an organisation from a business perspective and we therefore see it complementary to our approach. The assets and technical artefacts identified with the OCTAVE approach could be modelled and analysed using our approach.
An approach that is following a model-based risk analysis is CORAS [1, 9] . While the CORAS approach uses models mainly for descriptive purposes we employ models to systematically analyse the dependencies and interrelationships of business and technical objects of an enterprise.
Suh and Han [23] use a business model to identify business functions in order to evaluate the relative importance of information assets for these functions. Suh and Han focus solely on the security requirement of operational continuity. For this purpose they use a measure to denote the relative importance of technical assets for business functions.
Our work is based on the analysis of a Threat Graph which may be considered as a special type of an attack tree. Similar to our idea the construction of an attack graph starts with a goal of an attacker (can be seen as a reverse business security requirement). Then the goal is decomposed in smaller objectives which the attacker should fulfill to achieve his goal. The decomposition continues until simple steps are reached [18, 16, 25] . In contrast to this subjective way we propose a way of constructing the Threat Graph using an enterprise model. We also provide a qualitative analysis which is based on a well-known risk assessment technique. In contrast to [4] we first aggregate values (number of attacks in a period of time, which is similar to Annual Rate of Occurrences) and then estimate the impact for business security objectives rather than consider threats separately without linking them with the objectives.
Clark et. al. [8] also aggregated risk levels using an attack tree in order to evaluate the impact on enterprise's mission (business goal), but for aggregation they used number of existing vulnerabilities on leaf nodes treating them as risk measures which differs from classical Risk Assessment. Although we work on a level of requirements and threats and do not consider low level vulnerabilities our approach have something in common with attack graphs [17, 26, 13, 19] . In the work we implicitly use the causes and consequences of threats occurrences to build the Threat Graph while contracting Security Requirements Graph. On the other hand, our approach is top-down one (we start with a BSO and then refine the objective) when attack graph technique is a bottom-up approach (starting with a premise conditions it shows how an attacker can reach his goal).
Discussion
In this section we will give a short discussion about the general weaknesses and strengths of this approach.
The main advantage of the proposed assessment method is that it provides a way to quantify the impact of a security state of a specific element in the enterprise on a business security objective. The analyst may choose not only the technology which can mitigate the impact but also a concrete place where the countermeasure should be installed and thus more wisely distribute limited security resources. For example, if a more rigid software patching strategy is required and human resources are all already in use then it will be better to relocate some staff/time from the rating server, which impacts 'prevent fraud' objective not very significantly, to the money server, which has the greater impact on the objective. Also the analysis allows doing this on different levels of abstraction which means that a top security manager can operate with collective elements (e.g., client's software) to locate the area of investments, while if it is needed the corresponding domain owner can easily expand the element to conduct the more fine-grained analysis.
Among the weaknesses of the approach one can identify a rather informal way of eliciting security requirements. This will impose a lot on the analyst and on his experience. On the other hand, using the enterprise model as a basis we make the proposal more objective then attack trees [18, 16, 25] . What we have is a directed refinement of security requirement which will help the analyst.
Identifying concrete threats for specific elements is also a quite subjective task but some semi-automation way can be also proposed here. Currently we are developing a pattern-based system which employs a catalogue of basic combinations of dependencies between model elements. After an additional analysis of context information about an element it should be possible to propose all (or more significant) threats from a predefined list that could be applied to the element. The list of threats is a compiled list taken from security guidelines and standards like [6, 12] .
The most difficult part of the approach is identifying the weights. Although the correct identification of the values is a hard task we should take into account that the weights should be determined by the corresponding domain owners (e.g., weights showing possible impact on client's banking software are determined by the corresponding admin-istrators) which have a good knowledge about the model elements. In other words, the approach helps to easily distribute tasks among experienced actors (domain owners) because of its model-based nature rather than imposing the whole responsibility on a high level security manager collecting, aggregating and analyzing low level details. The figures can be taken from the past experience of the domain owners. For example, knowing the past numbers of capturing control over the money server node and numbers of misuses of money transfer application one can easily deduce the relative impact. Then the analyst may use this number in the future.
Conclusion and future work
In the paper we have presented the approach which analyzes how well a business security objective is fulfilled. This approach helps domain owners to conduct a finegraded assessment and find out the causes of failures (the weakest places in the security system). The proposed assessment is based on an enterprise modelling framework presented in [5, 11] that provides us a more objective way of constructing the Threat Graph (which can be seen as an attack tree).
As a future work we are going to apply the proposed approach in one of our projects to analyse the security of a distributed cross-institutional health data record network. One of the main focus in the study will be the evaluation of the complexity of the approach and its suitability for analysing service oriented architectures.
